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Abstract
This paper is a review of Vanessa Finch’s Corporate Insolvency Law – Perspectives and Principles
(Cambridge: CUP 2002). In particular, it examines Finch’s methodology for testing whether some part of
this law could be considered ‘legitimate’. Borrowing from Gerald Frug’s well-known analysis of the
strategies for attempting to legitimate corporate and bureaucratic power, Finch claims that the ‘legitimacy’
of corporate insolvency law is a matter of its ‘fairness’, ‘efficiency’, ‘expertise’, and ‘accountability’. This
paper asks if she provides a coherent understanding of these basic concepts, and whether her deployment of
these concepts yields useful insights free of the ‘inconsistencies of reasoning’ that she rightly deplores in
the way the law might have developed in the past.
The paper argues that Finch does not motivate her choice of ‘technical efficiency’ (referred to in this paper
as ‘transaction cost efficiency’) over other understandings of this concept, does not explain the sort of costs
this version of efficiency is meant to mitigate, nor the ‘desired ends’ in pursuit of which it is to be
harnessed. Because of these deficiencies, Finch fails to notice that ‘expertise’ and ‘accountability’ are in
fact aspects or components of ‘efficiency’. The paper explains how the former is a function of coordination
costs, the latter is a method for controlling coordination or motivation costs, and the mitigation of both
types of cost is very much part and parcel of transaction cost efficiency.
The paper introduces a distinction between the ‘substantive’ and the ‘procedural’ goals of any part of the
legal system. Substantive goals are the ultimate ends of some part of the law, some values or objectives
whose pursuit by that part of the law shows why it is desirable to have that law in the first place. Procedural
goals are about the methods the law adopts in pursuit of its substantive goals. It is argued that ‘efficiency’,
‘accountability’ and ‘expertise’ are procedural goals of the law, and can only make sense as benchmarks of
‘legitimacy’ if they are connected to the accomplishment of some substantive goal that insolvency law
could be shown to be committed to. ‘Fairness’ in Finch’s sense is, on the other hand, a substantive goal of
the law. One implication of recognising this distinction is that Finch’s repeated assertion that ‘fairness’
might sometimes have to be traded off against the other ‘three’ values, must be mistaken. ‘Fairness’ (as an
end) does not compete with ‘efficiency’, ‘expertise’, and ‘accountability’ (which are all means), and so
cannot be traded off against them.
Another implication is that Finch’s normative framework would only make sense if she could provide a
coherent and attractive theory of ‘fairness’, the ultimate end the pursuit by insolvency law of which is
facilitated by the other, procedural, values. Having examined the notions of ‘fairness’ Finch employs
throughout the book, the paper concludes that two of them are question begging, a third is probably
inconsistent with the others, and none of them withstands scrutiny.
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Introduction
Vanessa Finch argues in her book1 that insolvency law must develop according to a ‘guiding
philosophy’ which is internally consistent, which clearly identifies the values to which this law
must be responsive, and which makes explicit the trade-offs inevitably required between these
values. This philosophy would also have to grapple with the essential binaries of corporate law
generally, which, while being gently transformed in corporate insolvency, become here, if
anything, even more acute. So, to take two examples, insolvency law unarguably has the role of
enforcing private rights (paradigmatically, of creditors), but it also impinges dramatically on
issues of public concern (‘the lives or deaths of enterprises’ which affect ‘livelihoods and
communities’). And while one role of this law is undoubtedly to constrain the activities of
important players in this arena (directors, insolvency practitioners and institutional creditors, for
example), it must also create a space within which these players can bring to bear on the
proceedings, consistently with the normative aims of this law, their skills and expertise. Arming
decision makers with a guiding philosophy responsive to this array of concerns would then enable
them to go about the difficult task of making trade-offs between the competing values at play here
with ‘structured transparency’, and thus, with legitimacy.2
The book is divided into six parts, dealing respectively with the agendas and objectives of
insolvency law, the financial and institutional context in which this law operates, the purpose and
role of corporate ‘rescue’ procedures, the liquidation process, and the impact of insolvency on the
company’s directors and employees. A particular strength of the book is that it draws on articles
Finch has published over many years, especially on the role of the management in distress
situations. It also benefits greatly from Finch’s interdisciplinary perspective. There has been some
fine insolvency scholarship in this jurisdiction, but most of it has been doctrinal in nature.3 Finch
draws on economics, and generally, makes good use of empirical evidence relevant to her
arguments. She is at her best when examining the professional, institutional and other
motivational contexts which are shaped (to some extent) by the law, but within which the law
itself must find its place. The best parts of her book, dealing with the duties and liabilities of
directors, and with the competence and incentives of insolvency practitioners, have great depth,
dealing patiently and persuasively with the complexities involved.4
Finch’s book is, above all, an invitation to re-think the foundational principles of insolvency law.
Its most ambitious claim is that the arguments it constructs provide ‘a framework’ within which
‘insolvency law [may] develop with coherence and purpose’.5 This reviewer shares Finch’s
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concern with consistency of principle in this part of the law.6 One of the two central tasks of this
paper, then, is to ask if she succeeds in providing such a framework. The argument here begins by
considering the assumptions which underlie Finch’s theoretical approach, her recipe (as it were)
for a successful theory of insolvency law. It examines how she thinks a theory must be
constructed so as to be able to ask fruitful questions about the legitimacy of this bit of the law. It
is also natural to investigate whether her work actually lives up to these ideals. The argument then
turns to the ingredients of Finch’s theory. The concern here is whether she provides a coherent
understanding of her basic concepts and with the extent to which her deployment of these
concepts yields useful insights free of the ‘inconsistencies of reasoning’ that she rightly deplores
in the way the law might have developed in the past.7
The argument here aims to be constructive in being critical. Since this reviewer considers himself
a participant in the same general enterprise – of developing a principled framework within which
insolvency law might be analysed, and as appropriate, justified or criticised – the second main
concern of this paper is to provide suggestions as to how the weaknesses unearthed in Finch’s
approach might be made good. This happens through a discussion of the relationship between the
pivotal ‘benchmarks’ upon which Finch’s analysis turns.8 It should be noted that this review deals
with only one of several sets of issues raised in the book that are deserving of attention.
How to go about constructing a theory of insolvency law
Finch argues that since English insolvency law sometimes requires company directors to exercise
power appropriately, and at other times, disables them in order to empower creditors, insolvency
practitioners or courts, ‘the broad insolvency process in all its dimensions and with its variety of
actors… requires legitimation’.9 Claiming to draw inspiration (though by no means uncritically)
from Mary Stokes,10 and in particular, from Gerald Frug,11 Finch suggests the legitimating
process should seek to assess not merely the efficacy of the constraints on the actions of these
parties, but also the degree to which they are allowed or encouraged to exercise their skill and
judgement in a way conducive to the goals of the law. The process might be based on seeking
legitimation on the basis of arguments drawn from different – indeed conflicting – visions of
corporate law (e.g. contractarian and communitarian), even if each of the arguments could be
regarded as weak or flawed, and even if some arguments cut in the opposite direction from others.
This is because the process of seeking legitimation is not ‘like a chain of arguments as strong as
its weakest link [but in fact] a cable able to exert force according to the collective power of its
(albeit imperfect) strands.’12 Importantly, for Finch, assessing
the legitimacy of an insolvency process… differs from merely expressing a political
opinion on the topic. Persons of opposing political persuasions might differ radically in
their views on dealing with troubled companies… [However, to] debate legitimacy
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involves a stepping back and reference, not to personal preferences, but to criteria
enjoying broad acceptance as relevant.13
Having put in place these requirements for a successful theory, Finch sets about meeting them by
(what is variously described as) ‘paraphrasing and reorganising’,14 or ‘building on, but
repackaging’15 the views of Gerald Frug. Endorsing his claim that ‘we have adopted only a
limited number of ways to reassure ourselves’ about the exercise of organisational power,16 Finch
argues that legitimacy of the processes and principles of insolvency law can be tested by
reference to four values or ‘benchmarks’. Efficiency ‘looks to the securing of mandated ends at
lowest cost’, expertise ‘refers to the proper exercise of judgment [sic.] by specialists’,
accountability ‘looks to the control of insolvency participants by democratic bodies or courts or
through openness of processes and their amenability to representations’, and fairness ‘considers
issues of substantive justice and distribution’.17
So what are we to make of Finch’s basic methodology, and of these ‘core [values which provide]
a framework offering guidance in the development of insolvency rules and arrangements’?18 It is
suggested that Finch’s methodology is flawed, that her understanding of her ‘benchmark’
concepts lacks consistency, and that she is unable to provide a satisfactory account of their
relationship inter se. There is undoubtedly much to admire in her arguments, but whatever
weaknesses there are in her book can mostly be traced to these points.
Let us begin by recalling that in debating the legitimacy of a part of the law, Finch would have us
appeal to ‘criteria enjoying broad acceptance as relevant’. To do otherwise would be simply to
express a ‘political opinion’, which for Finch appears to be no different from expressing a mere
‘personal preference’, and that of course she would not allow.19 This is all puzzling. Consider first
the status of Finch’s prescription that legitimacy should be debated by reference only to criteria
that enjoy broad acceptance. Now, what makes this criterion for the debating of legitimacy
acceptable to her, something different from a mere ‘personal preference’? Perhaps it is because it
itself enjoys wide public support? In other words, perhaps those debating legitimacy must have
resort only to widely accepted values because only this way of arguing about legitimacy enjoys
broad acceptance? But even if true, this prescription would of course be viciously circular,
equivalent to saying that God should be obeyed because He has commanded that He be obeyed!
We cannot invoke the wide acceptance of a viewpoint in order to decide whether wide acceptance
of a viewpoint renders it superior to others less widely accepted. Finch would need some other
way of breaking out of this circularity, but none is suggested in her book.
Alternatively, it might be that Finch is doing no more here than giving friendly, prudential advice.
Perhaps she is merely expressing the plausible thought that a theory of legitimacy based on
widely accepted criteria would itself be much more likely to be accepted. But again, even if this is
an effective strategy for persuading others, advocating it here would be to misunderstand the
nature of arguments, especially those about legitimacy. Of course an ultimate purpose of any
argument is to persuade. But (unless, perhaps, we are advertisers, inter-varsity debaters or
politicians) we do not construct arguments so that they would be popular, nor does the popularity
13
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of an argument guarantee its validity or superiority. Rather, we make the arguments we think
upon reflection are valid, then hope that the fact that they are valid would make them inherently
persuasive, and thus gain them acceptance amongst those who engage with the issues with
sincerity and reflection and knowledge.20 In any case, we are not merely concerned here with any
odd argument, but with arguments about legitimacy. Upon these, ‘broad acceptance’ seems a
particularly strange condition to impose. Think about requiring those challenging the legitimacy
of racial segregation in schools in the American Deep South in the 1950s to help themselves to no
more than the values whose relevance was broadly accepted by the target population! Or if that
appears too far removed from the present context, then consider how a Marxist company law
scholar (and there are distinguished contemporary exemplars!) might react to a similar
suggestion.21
It seems, then, that Finch provides no alternative methodology of debating legitimacy other than
by ‘expressing political opinions’, and – needless to say – by defending these through rational and
reasonable argument.22 Nor is it sensible to conflate this process with asserting ‘personal
preferences’. Expressing a personal preference is about choosing vanilla over strawberry in icecream flavours, say. There is little or no possibility of fallibility here: we do not generally accept
that on such issues, what is the case might be different from what we take to be the case. There is
nothing you can say to persuade me that strawberry ice-cream tastes better than vanilla after all.
In a very different way, expressing a personal preference might be about buying the playfully
flowery yellow shirt rather than the fashionably austere black one. Political opinions are different
precisely because they are political, put forward as appropriate in regulating some aspect of the
life of one’s community and not just oneself, and which one is ready to defend other than by the
assertion of personal whim. Indeed, Finch’s own preferred methodology is either to be
understood along the same lines – as the political (and more importantly, interpretive) claim that
the legitimacy of laws is in fact best (not just popularly) understood in this context as a matter of
fairness, efficiency, accountability and expertise – or it should be dismissed as an undefended
assertion, something akin to a personal preference. 23
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About the ‘efficiency’ benchmark
The principles on which this ‘benchmark’ is based do not receive too much attention from Finch.
She says only that ‘Technical efficiency is concerned with achieving desired results with the
minimal use of resources and costs and the minimal wastage of effort’.24 However, it is not made
clear why ‘desired results’ may not be achieved with the ‘minimal use of resources’ in the first
place, what sort of ‘costs’ we wish to avoid here, and how effort might be ‘wasted’. Further and
importantly, is Finch’s notion of efficiency neutral as to the sort of ‘desired results’ it might be
directed at achieving? Remember after all that it is a benchmark for the legitimacy of insolvency
law, and legitimacy is of course a moral concept. So do the results that efficiency aims to achieve
at minimum cost also have to satisfy certain moral requirements? Also, would a conception of
legitimacy which did not invoke some notion of efficiency be deficient in some way? Finally,
Finch presents a list of different versions of efficiency, then simply declares that she would be
using a particular one of them. She does not motivate her choice, does not explain why she
plumps for this version rather than any other. Is this one of those ‘personal preferences’ that
might be altered at whim? It is submitted that leaving all these vital questions unanswered renders
Finch’s approach both incomplete and internally inconsistent.
As it happens, this reviewer shares the view that only one version of efficiency – the one that
Finch in fact selects – may be used as a benchmark to judge the legitimacy of a branch of law.25
As it also happens, explaining why this is so then allows us to do several constructive things with
Finch’s analysis. What follows has several aims, then. We will explore why Finch’s preferred
notion of efficiency – referred to in this reviewer’s previous work as transaction cost efficiency –
should be regarded as superior to others, what sort of relationship it has with her other
benchmarks, and what sort of desired results it can be directed towards. This will lead us to reject
Finch’s mistaken view that her benchmark values are conceptually on par in some way, so that
fairness and efficiency may be traded off against each other.26 It will also enable us to see that
‘expertise’ and ‘accountability’ have no separate standing of their own, and should be absorbed
within ‘efficiency’. This conclusion will then help us resolve some very revealing tensions within
Finch’s theory.
Why transaction cost efficiency?
So what is wrong with the other notions of efficiency on Finch’s list? Pareto efficiency, named
after the Italian economist credited with its invention, provides the usual starting point for
discussion of this subject. A distribution of resources (or opportunities or entitlements) is Pareto
optimal (or efficient) if any further change would not make even one person better off and would
make at least one person worse off, judged both times by the person’s own standards.27 To
understand what this means, suppose there are only two people (A and B) affected by a
transaction which consists of taking an asset away from A and giving it to B. The change is
Pareto superior if B compensates A fully for that loss, and is still better off himself. Likewise, a
change which affects numerous people is Pareto superior if all potential losers from the change
24
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have been fully compensated, and the gainers are still better off because of it. A distribution is
Pareto optimal (or efficient) when all such mutually beneficial exchanges have been fully
exhausted. Now clearly this notion has immediate and obvious appeal. ‘In a Pareto superior
transaction, somebody gains and nobody loses. Who could possibly object?’28 A transaction is
Pareto efficient only if it would secure the unanimous consent of all those affected by it, and
‘Who can quarrel with unanimity as a criterion of social choice?’29
However appealing the notion of Pareto efficiency might seem, it is not very useful.30 Hardly any
transaction in the world – perhaps none – satisfies the criterion of Pareto superiority. Almost
every transaction affects countless parties, at least some of whom are made worse off because of
it. At the very least, almost any transaction changes the pattern of demand for the resource
exchanged (by satisfying someone’s demand for it). It thus affects the market price of that
resource, thereby reducing the prices of identical or substitutory goods and adversely affecting the
suppliers of those goods.31 Further, given that few Pareto superior transactions can be made, it
follows that almost any state of affairs is Pareto optimal: ‘What is, is Pareto optimal’!32 Not much
guidance can be gained about the real world from a set of criteria which outlaws virtually every
transaction, and which validates almost any distribution of resources.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, named after its British inventors, is often put forward as a more useful
replacement.33 That it is sometimes referred to as ‘potential Pareto efficiency’ provides a clue.
Consider the simple two-party transaction again, where an asset is taken from A and given to B.
The transaction is Kaldor-Hicks superior if B could have compensated A fully for the latter’s loss
and still been better off. The feature which makes this version of efficiency different from the
previous one is precisely that no actual compensation is required here, so long as the gains to the
winners are larger than are the losses to the losers.34
This conception of efficiency suffers from serious problems, however.35 First, recall the formula
just given, that a transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the gains to those who ‘win’ from it are
larger than the losses to the losers. Consider how those losses are to be reckoned. The only
coherent measure available is the consent of each of the losers. So a transaction would be
efficient only if the party losing out could have been fully compensated to its own satisfaction,
while still leaving a surplus for the party benefiting from the transaction (call this the ‘K-H
surplus’).36 It follows, however, that if any person affected by a transaction objects very strongly
28
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to being deprived against his will of an asset or entitlement, so that a very high level of ex post
compensation would have to be offered to redress his grievance at being treated thus, then the
efficiency of the transaction becomes doubtful. Obviously, the greater the harm to the losing
party, the higher the compensation required to remedy it, and so the greater the possibility that
there is no K-H surplus.
All it takes to make the universe of Kaldor-Hicks-efficient transactions an empty set is one
person who sincerely cannot be bought – that is, a person who values autonomy, either his
own or that of others, so highly that no amount of after-the-fact compensation could
possibly leave him as well off as he would have been[,] had the loss never been inflicted
(without consent) in the first place.37
Again, transactions in the real world affect countless people. This is even truer of a rule or policy,
potentially governing multiple transactions, that we might seek to test using the criterion of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. This raises the probability that one of those affected by that rule or
policy would be someone ‘who sincerely cannot be bought’ in the sense specified above. Even if
that is not the case, it is likely there would be little or no K-H surplus in many, perhaps most,
instances, given the large number of adversely affected persons. So Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is
scarcely more useful than the Pareto version.
Second, arguments based on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency violate the fundamental egalitarian
principle that all persons are to be regarded as equals. One embodiment of this moral equality is
the maxim that they must be treated as ends, not as means.38 However, reliance on Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency to defend a rule or policy would imply that the mere fact of a gain for a large group of
people justifies losses to a smaller one. It would follow that those losing out because of the rule or
policy were being used merely as means towards the ends of others. Even great harm to them
would be acceptable, as long as a sufficiently large number of others derived small individual
benefits which, taken together, were even larger. To illustrate this objection, we can imagine a
transaction that inflicts loss on A, such that £100 of compensation would be required to make him
whole. The same transaction also, however, brings benefit to two hundred other people, each of
whom would be willing to pay £1 for that benefit. The K-H surplus is then £100 (the gain of £200
minus the loss of £100), and so the transaction is efficient. The problem, however, is that, once
the existence of the K-H surplus is established, no compensation need actually be provided to A
for the requirements of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to be satisfied. As noted, this is unacceptable to
anyone committed to the basic egalitarian principle.39
Finally, a problem common both to the Kaldor-Hicks and the Pareto versions of efficiency. On
either conception, whether the transfer of an asset from X to Y is efficient depends on whether Y
could compensate X for the loss and still be better off. However, Y’s ability to compensate X
extent or intensity of this state are thus incoherent, as, therefore, are attempts to aggregate the utility of
different individuals; see the insightful discussion in Lawson, above n 27 especially 66-71. For an excellent
and comprehensive treatment of the broader questions on this point, see Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue
(Cambridge MA: HUP, 2000), Ch 1.
37
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depends (among other things) on the prior distribution of resources. Very simply put, a rich Y
would be able to offer a larger payment to X for the transfer. What is more, note the dependence
of both types of efficiency on the preferences of individuals for a resource or an entitlement.
Efficiency is achieved when such a resource or entitlement is vested in the person who places the
greatest value on it, thus satisfying the recipient’s relevant preference. But a person’s preferences
themselves are a function (inter alia) of his initial wealth and income. This is easier to understand
if we remember that as defined in economics, wealth includes a person’s native endowments, his
skill at a sport or his possession of two healthy kidneys, etc.40 So a physically weak person would
have a greater preference for a legal entitlement to bodily integrity than someone stronger.41 And
a person might have a greater preference for leisure at one income level than at another.
It follows that ‘If income and wealth were distributed differently, the pattern of demands might
also be different and efficiency would require a different deployment of our economic
resources.’42 This shows also that simply because a transaction is efficient says nothing about its
normative merits. Efficiency depends on the prior distribution of income and wealth amongst the
parties, and that distribution may itself be unjust. If the initial distribution of resources is unjust,
attaining an efficient allocation of those resources would be simply meaningless, since it would
make that allocation no more desirable from the ethical point of view than if it were inefficient.
So efficiency of either sort says nothing about the ultimate justifiability of any transaction, and
thus, a fortiori, of any rule or policy.
The relationship between fairness and efficiency
For all these reasons, we must conclude that efficiency in itself does not provide a goal that any
area of the law should aim at. It creates no reason for the law to be one way rather than another.
This shows why efficiency concerns cannot be on par with fairness concerns, which do create
good reasons for the law to be one way rather than another. So contra Finch, fairness and
efficiency cannot be traded off against each other.43 But note the emphasised qualification, that
efficiency does not ‘in itself’ provide any goals for the law. Here is how this is to be understood.
Let us draw a distinction between what might be called procedural and substantive goals of the
law. A substantive goal of a certain branch of the law (or indeed of the law as a whole) would be
an end that it seeks to pursue. Taking corporate insolvency law as an example, the substantive
goals of this law might be stated, at different levels of abstraction, as ‘To be just to all the
relevant parties’, ‘To treat parties as equals’, ‘To provide a fair scheme of co-operation under the
circumstances peculiar to insolvency’, ‘To show equal concern and respect for the interests of all
those facing such circumstances’, and so on. Substantive goals, then, are those which justify the
existence of this part of the law by showing it in its best light, by demonstrating why it is
worthwhile having it.
Procedural goals, on the other hand, are about how the law goes about attaining its substantive
goals. For example, procedural goals would be concerned with the methods the law adopts to
implement a fair scheme of co-operation in the circumstances of corporate insolvency. This
40

See eg Calabresi, ‘About Law and Economics: A letter to Ronald Dworkin ‘ (1980) 8 Hofstra LR 553,
555 (referring to Dworkin, n 31 above, and Dworkin, ‘Why Efficiency?’ (1980) 8 Hofstra LR 563). For a
fuller discussion, see Johnsen, ‘Wealth is Value’ (1986) 15 J Legal Studies 263, 268-270.
41
See eg the classic, Calabresi and Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard LR 1089.
42
Posner, above n 27 15.
43
Thoughtful practitioners of Law and Economics have themselves long accepted some version of this
point; see eg Calabresi, above n 40, 555-558. More on this below.

9

perspective enables us to clarify the statement made above: efficiency can never be a substantive
goal of the law. It can never by itself confer justification on any part of it. However, efficiency –
understood properly – is quite indispensable as a procedural goal. Once a set of substantive goals
has been exogenously specified (e.g. using a theory of justice), efficiency can be used to judge
between various proposed schemes for implementing it.
Suppose we specify that a branch of the law should attain a set of substantive goals. Suppose also
that there are two proposals about how to bring about these goals. Now it is obvious no proposal
can be operationalised and implemented costlessly. Some resources will inevitably be consumed
simply in putting in place any such proposal, and in maintaining it in operation. Remember also
that most resources are scarce. So the more resources that are consumed in implementing a
particular scheme, the fewer that will be available for other worthwhile objectives. It follows that
if there are two methods of bringing about a certain goal in these circumstances, we must choose
the method which is less costly to implement, other things being equal. Any other decision would
amount to wasting resources, since the same objective could have been attained and in addition, a
surplus would be available for application towards other valued goals. This waste is morally
objectionable, then, to the extent that the attainment of those others goals is morally desirable.44
This provides an understanding of transaction cost efficiency.45 A method of implementing a set
of substantive goals is efficient in this way when the resources it consumes in the process of
implementation are lower than would be consumed by adopting any other feasible method of
implementation. Put differently, a method is efficient, given a particular amount of resources
dedicated towards implementation, when it can operationalise the set of substantive goals to a
greater degree than would be possible for any other feasible method.46 It is obvious that to attain
transaction cost efficiency should be a (procedural) goal of every part of a morally defensible
legal system. This, it is submitted, is how efficiency analysis should be employed in arguments
about the law, i.e., to determine whether it attains its substantive goals in the cheapest feasible
way.
This also helps us better understand why we must reject Finch’s repeated assertion that fairness
may sometimes have to be traded off against efficiency. These two ‘rationales’ cannot ‘pull in
opposite directions’47 because substantive goals and procedural ones, ends and means, do not
compete! This is perhaps the most deeply engrained confusion in her work, and it creates glaring
inconsistencies in it. So for example, she emphasises at one point that efficiency is about
producing, ‘at minimal cost and without waste[,] whatever social and distributional goals are set
by society’.48 This is an accurate statement of the relationship between substantive and procedural
goals: the latter can be attained only by reference to the former, which means substantive goals
must be settled upon before procedural ones are chosen. Put another way, we cannot even
understand what counts as efficiency ‘costs’ and ‘waste’ until we decide what ends we wish to
pursue.
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A similar point is made by Grunebaum, Private Ownership (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987),
159.
45
This draws on, but is not identical with, the discussion of efficiency in Milgrom and Roberts, Economics,
Organization & Management (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1992), 22-30.
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See Milgrom and Roberts, ibid, 24.
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Contra Finch, 50.
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This might sound strange, so consider this simple example. Suppose a company’s directors have
signed contracts with the company which create incentives for them to run it so as to further the
interests, predominantly, of the shareholders as a group. Now if the end is to maximise
shareholder value, then the directors’ contractual allegiance to shareholders is desirable and
should be encouraged. On the other hand, if the end is to ensure directors operate impartially as
amongst shareholders, creditors and employees, then their exclusive allegiance to shareholders is
a ‘cost’ and should be mitigated. Now consider the following sort of assertion: ‘In assessing
whether the law’s treatment of employees leads to efficiency in insolvency processes, it is
necessary to keep the efficiency question separate from the issue of fairness or distributional
justice’.49 This is incoherent (as well as inconsistent) if, as Finch herself suggests above, one can
only think about efficiency in terms of distributional goals which have already been selected. We
can keep the efficiency question separate from the issue of fairness (or else some other
substantive goal) precisely to the same extent that we can ask directions without specifying where
we want to go.
As for the trade-offs which are the stuff of social decision-making, potentially the most
misleading situation arises when we have a rough idea about what our substantive goal is, and a
strictly limited pool of resources with which to accomplish it. Here, the temptation to see a
competition between, say, distributional goals and efficiency, is strong. However, the competition
is only between different versions of the substantive goal (or two sufficiently similar substantive
goals), and this competition might well be judged by using, as a medium or scale, the amount of
resources available. Space will not allow adequate treatment of this point, but an example would
be helpful.50 Consider the problem of distributing the residual estate of an insolvent company (i.e.
whatever is left after statutory, proprietary, and contractual preferential claims have been met),
which is one way of allocating the loss resulting from the insolvency. One of the factors relevant
here would be the respective ability of the claimants to bear that loss. So one might wish to
investigate the characteristics of the claimants to determine who among them should get priority.
The sort of factors which might arguably be relevant would be their relative vulnerability to
serious detriment, and whether this vulnerability resulted because a particular creditor had been
less cautious in planning for this type of loss than all the others, or because he had more
expensive tastes for consumables. At the end of this process, however, the sums to be distributed
would generally be minute, and the costs of investigation of these factors would be vast. ‘So in
order to save these costs’, as we might say, the law settles instead for a proportionate distribution
according to the famed pari passu principle.
As noted, it is tempting to see this as a conflict between justice or fairness (distribution of the
estate according to deep luck-egalitarian principles) and efficiency (the need to save the costs of
investigating the parties’ characteristics). What is more, it might also be taken to show that in
such a conflict, fairness or justice might sometimes be trumped by efficiency. This temptation
leads to conceptual (and moral) error and should be resisted. Remember that we start off having
accepted that the estate is to be distributed, to the extent possible, amongst the claimants. So the
actual competition is between two interpretations of this goal. Given the small pool of assets
which is to be distributed, but from which also the costs of distribution are to be met, the choice is
between either spending a lot on investigating who should get what and then distributing, at most,
a minute proportion of the estate amongst the claimants, or, softening the demands made on the
investigation process in order to distribute a larger proportion to them. The choice, then, is about
how much of the goal (more abstractly construed) should be implemented, and this itself is to be
determined using fairness or justice reasoning. The pari passu principle is (only) appropriate as a
49
50

Finch, 559. See also at 490.
The following draws on and develops Mokal, ‘Priority as Pathology’ [2001] CLJ 581, 613-4.
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residual, fall-back mechanism because there must come a time when the fairness benefits of
making any further enquiries about who should get what are outweighed by the fairness
disadvantages of dissipating the estate so that the remaining claimants as a group get little or
nothing.51
Collapsing ‘expertise’ and ‘accountability’
Because Finch does not provide substance to her ‘efficiency’ benchmark,52 she treats ‘expertise’
and ‘accountability’ as distinct attributes on par with fairness and efficiency, and so presumably,
liable to be traded off against either or both. However, once we understand more fully what
transaction cost efficiency is, and what sort of ‘costs’ it aims to minimise, we will see that this is
a mistake.
To set the scene, here are some general considerations which indicate that Finch’s division is
problematic.53 First and as already noted, she provides no statement or general description of the
sort of ‘costs’ the elimination of which would result in efficiency. Nor does she provide any
understanding of ‘expertise’, and in fact this benchmark seems more or less redundant in her
discussion.54 Second, a moment’s thought reveals ‘expertise’ and ‘accountability’ must bear the
same sort of relationship to ‘fairness’ as does ‘efficiency’. Fairness is a substantive goal of the
law, whereas expertise and accountability are procedural ones. Fairness even by itself might be an
ultimate criterion of legitimacy, but this is true of neither expertise nor accountability.55 Finch’s
argument suffers because she fails to distinguish between the diverse nature of her benchmarks.
So in commenting on the fact that insolvency practitioners sometimes use their repeat-player
51

This reasoning would be acceptable to parties bargaining in the choice position of the Authentic Consent
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expertise to overwhelm and sideline creditors at creditors’ meetings, she adds, as if as an
afterthought, that ‘Such an account, of course, emphasises the danger of evaluating insolvency
processes by using a benchmark of expertise without reference to objectives: liquidation may be a
process that lends itself to certain misdirections of expertise’.56 It should be obvious that far from
being a sort of optional extra, this consideration is of the essence if one wishes to use ‘expertise’
– and indeed ‘accountability’ and ‘efficiency’ – as criteria of legitimacy. Like efficiency, the
‘other’ benchmarks also can only be understood by reference to the contribution they make to the
attainment of substantive goals. It will be argued below that failure to distinguish between
substantive and procedural goals considerably weakens Finch’s approach.
Returning to efficiency, there are two broad (and overlapping) categories of transaction costs (i.e.
the costs inherent in implementing a set of substantive goals) relevant here.57 Co-ordination costs
are the costs arising from the fact that there are limits on what people in the real world can
foresee, and on their cognitive capacity for selecting the appropriate response to a set of
circumstances presented to them. These costs also arise because there are informational
asymmetries, e.g. information relevant to the common plans of both A and B is available only to
the former, or is available to him to a greater degree than to the latter. An example from the
corporate insolvency context is that of the co-ordination problems faced by the creditors of a
company on the verge of insolvency.58 One implication, given the aim of implementing any set of
substantive goals requiring co-operation, is that some resources would have to be expended either
ensuring that information is available to a fuller and more uniform degree to all the relevant
actors, or that the adverse effects of this not being the case are remedied.
With this in mind, this reviewer suggests that co-ordination costs are a function, inter alia, of
expertise. This is for several reasons. First, on the assumption that there are inherent differences
amongst individuals as to the potential to develop certain skills, some of the social resources
earmarked towards the imparting of those skills would have to be spent finding the right
candidates to impart them to.59 Then there are search costs involved for a potential buyer of
expertise in locating it. Information that there is an expert who can do the job within the
constraints set by her financial resources, say, has to be discovered by the buyer, information that
there is a set of tasks his expertise would allow him to perform rewardingly has to be discovered
by the seller, and there will seldom be a perfect overlap in what the buyer requires and the
supplier provides.60 Third, the greater the complexity of the tasks involved and the more
knowledge available on how to perform them, the greater will be the division of labour amongst
the experts in the area, and so the greater the co-ordination costs of their working together.61
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Finally, there is the risk, given the expert’s cognitive limitations, of his choosing the nonoptimum strategy for dealing with the task at hand, one requiring ten hours of work when it could
have been performed in eight, say. Take these together and it is clear Finch’s ‘expertise’
benchmark is very much an aspect of efficiency, since it is mostly about such costs, and
efficiency is about attempting to reduce these costs.
The second category of transaction costs is motivation costs. These arise because, once again
along with asymmetric information, different actors have different incentives about how to
behave in any situation, since they perceive their interests not to lie in the same direction. Again
given the aim of implementing a set of substantive goals requiring co-operation, some resources
would have to be expended aligning their interests in such a way that the actors would be
encouraged to pursue those goals. In English corporate insolvency law, a good example is found
in the wrongful trading provisions in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which seek to align
the interests of managers of firms on the verge of insolvency with the interests of the firm’s
creditors.
Once again, it is suggested that to the extent that ‘accountability’ is concerned with issues distinct
from those considered under the ‘expertise’ benchmark,62 it is a function of motivation costs: the
greater the latter, the greater the need for the former, and vice versa. We can test this by
imagining a situation where the agent can be reliably ‘programmed’ to do precisely what is in the
principal’s interests. In this case, the need for accountability disappears.63 And divergences from
the principal’s interests can arise, broadly, for any of two types of reasons. They can arise either
through the agent’s incompetence or poor judgement, in which case we are back to considering
issues of ‘expertise’ and therefore are dealing with co-ordination costs as described above. Or
they can arise because of the agent’s fraud, cheating, or shirking, so that we are squarely within
the ambit of motivation costs. There is strong evidence in Finch’s text that she is being compelled
by this logic to put ‘accountability’ under the ‘efficiency’ umbrella. This is clear, for example, in
her discussion of the latter benchmark, of ‘the office-holder’s need to justify claims to
remuneration’ and to ‘explain the nature [and rationale] of the main tasks undertaken’ to
stakeholders.64 And in the context of devising effective ‘rescue’ mechanisms, she explains
accountability by reference to opportunistic behaviour and the costs of ensuring access to the
proceedings for, and supervision by, the relevant parties.65 This is all the very stuff of motivation
costs.
The burdens of ‘fairness’
So far we have examined three of the four benchmarks that Finch claims must be present for a
part of the law to be legitimate. It was suggested above that Finch’s discussion of these attributes
suffers from a lack of coherence, because, apart from brief definitions, she does not reveal the
principles governing them, nor the factors which distinguish them from each other. The result is
that various of her arguments seem to have been thrust almost randomly under one heading when
but also that so is the accountability often required to overcome conflicts of interest; see the discussion of
motivation costs, below.
62
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63
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institution of accountability may only have meaning and value in a context where there are motivation
costs. And second and even if this is not the case, the resource-starved world of insolvency law does not
seem to permit room for much symbolism.
64
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Finch, 193. See also at 495.

14

they could easily have been discussed under either of the other two. The problem with this, of
course, is that insight gained from a coherence of perspective and a comparison of like with like
might be lost. The discussion above attempted to remedy this deficiency by providing a
justification for Finch’s choice of transaction cost efficiency, by showing how it necessarily
encompasses the other two benchmarks, and by thus bringing out both unnecessary duplications
and meaningful distinctions in the analysis.
Most importantly, a distinction was drawn between the ultimate ends of the law, and the methods
it adopts in attempting to achieve those ends. It was pointed out that the ‘three’ benchmarks so far
considered are about means not ends, and therefore, that their invocation is entirely question
begging unless it can be connected to a clear statement of the ultimate aims the law is attempting
to attain. Only in that case would we be able to evaluate the fruitfulness of Finch’s analysis in
helping us understand the law’s efficiency in attaining those ends. Her ‘fairness’ benchmark
provides a suitable candidate – as noted, fairness can undoubtedly serve as a substantive goal of
the law. In view of this, her discussion of fairness bears a heavy analytic burden. So finally in this
review, that is what we must now consider.
Fairness is utilised throughout the book in Finch’s analysis of the legitimacy of various parts of
the law.66 It is unfortunate, then, that yet again, nowhere does she provide a statement of her
conception of fairness, let alone a defence of her theory of it. As noted above, we get a hint that
‘fairness considers issues of substantive justice and distribution’.67 Yet even this minimal
understanding of what she might mean by ‘fairness’ is not secure. This is because, in criticising
contractarian justificatory models, Finch asserts that in them, the ‘distinction… between
principles of fairness and justice and principles governing the allocation of other goods such as
wealth is… problematic’.68
Casting an eye back on Finch’s own suggestion about what fairness is, the reader would see why
this muddies the waters considerably. How can there be a distinction of this sort, when Finch
herself recognises that fairness is (in some appropriate way) about the justice of distributions?
Surely this includes distributions of ‘goods such as wealth’? Nor is it plausible to suppose that
she regards this ‘insight’ too occult to have been accessible to contractarians. Amongst those
contractarians who are explicitly interested in fairness and justice (so that the early Thomas
Jackson, for example, is excluded),69 it is well known that many regard the justice of a decision to
be dependent upon the fairness of the decision-making process. And, to take some examples
mentioned by Finch herself, Rawls understands justice to be about the distribution of certain
‘primary goods’, including wealth; Korobkin takes justice in insolvency situations to be a matter
of the distribution of influence over the strategies and actions of the distressed corporation;70 and
for this reviewer, it is about the distribution of rights in the insolvent company’s assets.71 Since
66
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Finch acknowledges that contractarian theories are concerned with ‘principles of fairness and
justice’, then, and since she also accepts that fairness and justice are (at least partly) about
principles governing distributive issues, it is difficult to understand what ‘distinction’ between
these and the so-called ‘principles governing the allocation of other goods such as wealth’ she
would require contractarians to render more ‘unproblematic’. What is more, given that this makes
it seem that there might for Finch be such a ‘distinction’, it becomes even more difficult to
understand what she means throughout the book when she talks about ‘fairness’.
Now, even though there is no general or abstract statement or theory of what Finch understands
by ‘fairness’, she writes copiously about it in particular contexts. It could be, then, that a
reasonably accurate picture of her conception of fairness could be built up through an analysis of
these more specific discussions.72 It is important that we have such a picture: since Finch is
committed (and rightly so) to ‘philosophical consistency’, we need reassurance that, say, the
conception of fairness invoked by her to approve one part of the law does not fall by the wayside
when another part of it is condemned. If, on Finch’s preferred view, fairness demands X in stateof-affairs 1, then in state-of-affairs 2, which is similar in all relevant respects, it should not
demand Not-X. Of course if this were the case, we would either have to reject at least one (or
perhaps both) of those analyses, or require a principled justification of the apparent
inconsistency.73 Finch also of course needs to explain why she has chosen the theory which
demands X in state-of-affairs 1 in the first place.
However, poring over Finch’s various discussions of the ‘fairness’ benchmark is not reassuring.
She appears to invoke at least three notions of fairness, at least two of which are questionsbegging, and two of which conflict with each other at least prima facie. Her discussion of
receivership provides an interesting case study. At one point, Finch appears to condemn the
institution as ‘unfair’ because, among other things, the floating charge holder is not required to
consider the interests of any other party, and could take decisions affecting their interests without
their consent.74 However, even assuming that fairness requires the consent of those affected by a
decision,75 Finch pays no attention to the questions how such consent might appropriately be
obtained. This is unfortunate because, mirroring debates further afield, this is the question
attracting most of the controversy in insolvency scholarship. So for example, Hobbes and Kant,76
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Gauthier and Rawls,77 Posner and Dworkin,78 and Jackson and Korobkin,79 – and even your
reviewer80 – all might agree or be willing to assume that the consent of those affected by a
decision is relevant to its fairness (in Finch’s sense), yet still have very diverse views about what
is thereby entailed for theories of fairness, and about how consent might be sought. What a
consent theorist thinks fairness recommends would of course be different – often, dramatically so
– depending on their answers to these questions.
So for example, in response to the suggestion that receivership might be regarded as ‘fair’
because floating charge holders have paid for their right to appoint a receiver in the form of lower
interest rates on their loans, and because trade creditors enjoy higher profit margins than the
charge-holding banks, Finch retorts that this would not do because ‘markets [may] not allow high
profit margins, that the institution of receivership offers a means for the better placed banks to
exploit their positions, and that the interest rates charged by the floating charge holders are
excessively profitable because risks are loaded onto unsecured creditors’.81 However, even to
someone committed to the relevance of consent, this is all question begging. In the famous
Creditors’ Bargain model, for example, the unsecured creditors’ alleged weaknesses are part of
their very identity, and so should be reflected in the process through which consent is sought and
fairness thus established.82 Now Finch apparently rejects this model’s notion of consent.83 But she
also rejects the alternative luck-egalitarian (Rawlsian) conception (which might condemn
decisions that reflect the weaknesses Finch claims unsecured creditors suffer from).84 And
crucially, she suggests no method herself of determining whether consent is present, and if it is,
whether it has been validly given. It follows that the consent-based arguments she makes or
endorses are quite question begging, since they could be rejected by adopting some ways of
determining the presence and validity of consent, upheld by adopting others, and Finch has no
consistent way of arguing for or against any of these.
Secondly, there is sometimes an appeal to the existence of ‘conflicts of interests’ to sustain a
charge of unfairness. For example, on the page following the one where Finch makes the
arguments discussed above, she says that ‘an important aspect of fairness in decision-making is
the disinterestedness of decision-makers’.85 She uses this observation to raise doubts about the
practice whereby ‘receivers are appointed from firms of accountants who have advised and
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advocated receivership’ to the major creditors in the first place.86 This particular argument is
unfortunate, since it also displays Finch’s very occasional tendency to speak gently about
empirical evidence if it stands in the way of a satisfying polemic!87 Ignoring that, though, and
focussing on her general strategy, it is submitted that it is question-begging to assert that
‘conflicts of interest’ and a lack of disinterestedness on the part of decision-makers create
‘unfairness’. Suppose A and B find themselves in a position where their interests conflict, and
where X would have to decide whose interests should prevail. Assume (uncontroversially) that a
‘conflict of interest’ arises when a decision-maker’s interest and duty might conflict. In that case,
we must decide whose interests should prevail as a matter of fairness before we can decide the
nature of decision-maker X’s duty. Only at that point are we in a position to say whether X faces
a ‘conflict of interests’ (in the usual normative sense) that we should be concerned to remedy, and
about whether the lack of disinterestedness on her part is unacceptable on fairness grounds.
This is clear from the example considered above concerning directors’ duties. Suppose that, as a
matter of fairness, the interests of the shareholders of a solvent company as a group (A) should be
given priority over the interests of all other ‘stakeholders’ (B). If so, then the fact that the
company’s directors (X) have signed contracts with the company which create incentives for
them to run the company so as to further the interests, predominantly, of the shareholders as a
group, does not create an objectionable ‘conflict of interests’, nor is the directors’
disinterestedness in this matter something to be desired. It is in fact right on fairness grounds to
orient the managers’ interests in the same direction as the interests of shareholders, because the
shareholders are the very parties owed the benefit of directors’ (fairness-based) duties in the first
place. Our conclusions about such contracts would however be different if, as a matter of fairness,
solvent companies should be run in a manner that is impartial between the interests of
shareholders, creditors, and employees. Now there would be a need to interfere to sever the
connections between what is to the shareholders’ and the directors’ advantage, since these
connections are unfair, and therefore create a ‘conflict of interests’ between the directors’
interests and their fairness-based duties. Finally, though, suppose we start off having no
information about what fairness demands here, but once again, are informed that the sort of
contracts mentioned above had been concluded. Unless we allow external intuitions to be
smuggled illicitly into our reasoning here, it seems we simply have no fairness-based reason for
interfering in the situation, nor indeed for judging there to be a ‘conflict of interest’ in the
normative sense.88
This shows that the question of whose interests should prevail as a matter of fairness is prior to
any determination of whether the law tolerates an objectionable ‘conflict of interests’, say, in the
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way receivers are appointed.89 It follows that Finch’s appeals to alleged ‘conflicts of interests’ to
establish the existence of ‘unfairness’ gets things the wrong way around. There must be a prior
laying out and defence of a theory of fairness, a determination of whose interests should prevail
on these grounds, in order to establish a fairness-based duty in the first place, and thus to show
the existence of a ‘conflict of interests’ in the sense relevant here. And this Finch does not
provide. In addition to all this, the way in which decision-makers should be disinterested is
intensely controversial,90 but nothing in Finch’s book shows us how to resolve those
controversies.
Matters are made worse because, on the same page that she relies on a ‘conflict of interest’-based
notion of ‘fairness’, Finch invokes yet another conception of this benchmark. This one is
apparently ‘fairness’ to ‘society as a whole’, and seems based either on social wealth
maximisation (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) or Pareto-efficiency.91 The problem, however, is that not
only are both of these versions of ‘efficiency’, which for Finch is a benchmark in its own right
distinct from ‘fairness’,92 but neither is capable of functioning as a defensible notion of fairness in
any case.93 What is more, the dramatic tendency of this alleged form of ‘fairness’ to clash with
those which regard justification to the individual as central (such as those based on notions of
consent, including at least one considered above) is well known.94
Conclusion
None of this detracts from the valuable contribution that Finch’s book makes to the literature. Not
only is it the first sustained attempt in this jurisdiction to provide a non-doctrinal analysis and
critique of this important area of the law, but also, at its best, it provides a deep, provocative, and
ultimately persuasive account of several of its individual parts, and of how they operate in
practice. There is also an impressive breadth in the scholarship. In fact, one of the most important
uses of the book may well be that it brings together analyses from a hugely diverse range of
perspectives, thus providing the starting point for any detailed examination of this law.
However, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the promise of ‘philosophical consistency’ is
rather far from being kept. With a little imagination, the three versions of ‘fairness’ discussed
above could be used to condemn almost anything as unfair while at the same time upholding it as
fair. And in the absence of a clear statement of what substantive goals the efficiency – and thus
the accountability and expertise – criteria are directed towards, all we are left with is a repeated
appeal to raw, unsystemised intuitions.
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